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For the last fifty years, countries in Asia and elsewhere have witnessed a surge in aggregate 
savings per capita. Some empirical studies attribute this trend to the increases in life longevity 
of the populations of these countries. It has been argued that the rise in savings is short-run, 
eventually to be dissipated by the dissaving of the elderly, whose proportion in the population 
rises along with longevity. This paper examines whether these conclusions are supported by 
economic theory. A model of life-cycle decisions with uncertain survival is used to derive 
individuals' consumption and chosen retirement age response to changes in longevity from 
which changes in individual savings are derived. Conditions on the age-profile of 
improvements in survival probabilities are shown to be necessary in order to predict the 
direction of this response. Population theory (e.g. Coale, 1952) is used to derive the steady-
state population age density function, enabling the aggregation of individual response 
functions and a comparative steady-state analysis. Under certain conditions, increased 
longevity is shown to increase aggregate savings per capita. These conclusions pertain to an 
economy with a competitive annuity market. The absence of such market compels individuals 
to leave unintended bequests, whose size depends on the (random) age of death. While an 
increase in longevity raises individual savings for given endowments, it is shown that the 
effect on expected steady-state aggregate savings, taking into account the endogenous ergodic 
distribution of endowments, cannot be determined a-priori. 
JEL Code: D1, D6, E2, H0. 
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Mortality has fallen substantially in the past hundred years: in 1900 about
2.5 people per 100 died in a typical year. Today, mortality is two-thirds lower
(Cutler (2004)). This translates to substantially greater life expectancy both at
birth and, particularly in recent history, at later ages. In many countries, the
rise in longevity was accompanied by an increase in aggregate (real) savings per
capita1. Investigators who studied these trends regard the former as a major
cause of the latter (for example, Deaton and Paxson (1997)). In particular, the
surge in savings in East Asia between 1950 and 1990 is attributed largely to the
rapidly improving life expectancy in the region (see, for example, Lee, Mason
and Miller (1998, 2000) and Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2005)).
Does economic theory provide the underpinning for this conclusion? The
answer rests on two levels of analysis. First, the foundation is an analysis
of individual life-cycle decisions when facing survival probabilities. This will
produce endogenous consumption functions and optimum retirement ages. A
crucial assumption for modeling individual decisions is the availability of insur-
ance. Speci￿cally, with respect to longevity risks, the possibility of annuitizing
savings.
Close examination of an individual multi period model reveals that to
predict individual￿ s response it is important to specify the age pro￿le of im-
provements in survival probabilities. Savings and retirement age response can
be expected to be quite di⁄erent when the decrease in mortality rates is concen-
trated at younger ages compared to the case when this decrease is concentrated
at older ages. The data supports the signi￿cance of this observation.
As Cutler (2004) points-out, the trend of declining mortality had three
distinct phases. Early in the twentieth century there has been a signi￿cant
drop in infant mortality due to improvements in nutritional and general health
conditions. This was followed by a major reduction in mortality rates of adults
due to infectious diseases. "Until the 1950￿ s there was no evidence in any soci-
ety of people reducing mortality from chronic diseases of old age... and then
1Aggregate savings in absolute terms are naturally expected to increase with the growth
of population (due, say, to higher longevity, birth rates or other reasons).
3cardiovascular disease mortality started declining extremely rapidly" (Cutler,
(2004, p.8)). The trend of life lengthening due to medical advances aimed
at older people is still present. This history of uneven age speci￿c declines in
mortality rates underlines the importance of the theoretical question addressed
in this paper: how do alternative patterns of decline in mortality rates a⁄ect
individual and aggregate behavior?
The second level, building on the ￿rst, is an aggregation analysis of in-
dividuals￿behavior. Changes in survival probabilities a⁄ect the medium and
long-run population age density function. The dynamics of the demographic
process generated by such changes is quite complex. There exists, however, a
well developed theory of the dependence of steady-state population age den-
sity distributions on the underlying parameters (e.g. Coale (1952, 1957)). To
study the e⁄ects of changes in longevity on aggregate savings these endogenous
changes in the age density function have to be taken into account.
This paper performs these two tasks: ￿rst, it sets up a model of individual
decisions under longevity risks and, second, it aggregates individual decisions,
linking survival functions with the population age density function.
Our objective is to formulate precise conditions which enable one to deter-
mine the micro and long-run macro e⁄ects on savings of changes in longevity.
2 A Simple Life-Cycle Model With Uncertain
Survival
Consider a simple individual life-cycle model with uncertain survival. At age 0;
the probability of surviving to age z is F(z) : F(0) = 1, and F 0(z) ￿ 0; z ￿ 0:
There may be a ￿nite age T > 0 for which F(T) = 0; but this is immaterial.2
Individuals derive instantaneous utility u(c) (u0 > 0, u00 < 0); independent
of age, from consumption, c, and can decide to work or retire (disregarding the
choice of labor intensity). Work is normalized to a level of unity.
2Philipson and Becker (1998) allow individuals to a⁄ect their survival functions (say, by
improved health care) which may create a ￿ moral hazard￿problem. We disregard this e⁄ect.
4Disutility from work at age z, e(z) > 0; is assumed to be independent
of consumption and, in order to ensure that work precedes retirement, non-
decreases with age, (e0(z) ￿ 0). In the absence of time-preference, expected








where c(z) is consumption at age z and R is the age of retirement.
Let a(z) be the amount of annuities held by an age z individual3. Then
the dynamic budget constraint is
_ a(z) = r(z)a(z) + w(z) ￿ c(z) (2)
where _ a(z) is the amount of annuities purchased (> 0) or sold (< 0); r(z) is the
instantaneous rate of return on annuities and w(z) is the wage rate (w(z) = 0
for z > R) for an age z individual. Solving (2) (with a(0) = 0); the demand











(w(x) ￿ c(x))dx (3)
In a competitive annuity market equilibrium, the rate of return on annu-









where f(z) = ￿
dF(z)
dz
is the probability of dying at age z4.













w(z)F(z)dz = 0; (5)
3We know from Yaari (1965) that when longevity is the only uncertainty then individuals
annuitize all their assets. The modi￿cations required when individuals have a positive time
preference and/or there is a positive interest rate on non-annuitized assets are well-known.
4See Sheshinski (2006).
5Thus, equilibrium condition (4) implies that expected consumption is equal
to expected wages, that is, zero expected pro￿ts. Maximization of (1) s.t.(5)

















F(z)dz is life expectancy5.
Condition (7) equates the marginal bene￿ts and costs of a small postpone-
ment of retirement.
For simplicity, assume that the wage rate is constant: w(z) = w: This
ensures that the solution (c￿; R￿) to (6) - (7) is unique6.
Individual savings at age z, s￿(z), are positive during the working phase
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; R￿ < z < 1
(8)
In the absence of a bequest motive, expected savings over the whole life-








6A su¢ cient condition for the existence of an interior solution is that e(z) strictly increases
from zero to 1 as z rizes from zero to T.
63 E⁄ects of Longevity Changes on Individual
Decisions
Suppose that the survival function depends on a parameter denoted ￿, F(z;￿),




< 0, at all ages, z > 07. This implies, of course,
that expected lifetime, ￿ z(￿) =
1 R
0
F(z;￿)dz; decreases with ￿:































’(R￿; ￿) = 0. Hence, if
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@R￿(R￿; ￿) ￿ 0
￿
@’
@R￿(R￿; ￿) ￿ 0
￿
for all R￿ > 0 (with strict inequality for some R￿), then ’(R￿; ￿) > 0

























7Though F(0;￿) = 1 for any ￿. If the e⁄ect of a change in ￿ on F(z;￿) is continuous,
the implication is that this e⁄ect around z = 0 is small. See Assumption 1 below. When
there is a ￿nite T for which F(T;￿) = 0, this makes T depend on ￿. In view of the rise in
survival probabilities at very old ages, this is to be expected.
7The more reasonable case is when increases in survival probabilities, hold-
ing retirement age unchanged, lead to a decrease in consumption. Hence the




/F(z;￿) is monotone non-increasing in z for
all z > 0.
This assumption has a straightforward interpretation: improvements in
survival rates are proportionately larger at later ages. It is equivalent to as-
suming that an increase in ￿ raises the Hazard-Rate8.
It follows from (10) and (11) that under Assumption 1,
@c￿
@￿
> 0, that is, an




is monotone non-decreasing in z; then
@c￿
@￿
< 0. When increases in survival
probabilities are proportionately larger at early ages compared to later ages
then individuals, naturally, increase consumption (and decrease savings).
The e⁄ect of a change in survival probabilities on optimum retirement is




















where ￿ = ￿
u00(c￿)c￿
u0(c￿)
























8According to a standard de￿nition of Stochastic Dominance (see Sheshinski (2003)),
when this assumption is satis￿ed then a survival function with a lower ￿ stochastically
dominates any survival function with a higher ￿:
































By Assumption 1, an increase in longevity increases the optimum retire-
ment age, but this only partially compensates for the decrease in optimum




We summarize the analysis so far:








It is of interest to ￿nd the e⁄ect of a change in ￿ on expected optimum




























Strict concavity of u(c) and the assumption that e0(z) ￿ 0 ensure that
dV ￿
d￿
< 0. As expected, an increase in longevity always increases welfare9.
9This result depends on our assumption that u(c) > 0 independent of age, compared to
zero utility at death. In discussions of life extending treatments this assumption has at times
been questioned.
94 Longevity Changes and Aggregate Savings
Suppose that the population grows at a constant rate, g. The steady-state age








is the birth rate.
The growth rate g, in turn, is determined by the second fundamental




￿gzF(z;￿)b(z)dz = 1 (16)
where b(z) is the age speci￿c fertility function.














10Equations (15) and (16) are derived as follows (see, for example, Coale (1952) and
(1957)): let the current number of age z females be n(z), while the total number is N.
When population grows at a rate g, the number of females z periods ago was Ne￿gz: If m is
















This yields equation (15). By de￿nition m =
1 R
0
h(z;￿;g)b(z)dz; where b(z) is the age z
fertility rate. Substituting the above de￿nition of h(z;￿;g) we obtain (16).
10An increase in longevity raises the steady-state growth rate of the pop-
ulation. The magnitude of g depends implicitly on the form of the survival,
F(z; ￿), and fertility, b(z), functions. It can be solved explicitly in some spe-
cial cases. For example, for F(z;￿) = e￿￿z and b(z) = b > 0; constant, for all





































It is seen that S = 0 when g = 0. A stationary economy without popula-
tion growth has no aggregate savings per capita, corresponding to zero personal
lifetime savings.
We shall now show that S > 0 when g > 0. Denote average life expectancy










Accordingly, the average population age, e z; is









Clearly, e z(R) < e z for any R:















A(e z ￿ e z(R)) > 0 (21)
Hence, a positive population growth rate, g > 0, implies that aggregate
steady-state savings per capita are positive.
In order to isolate the e⁄ect of the change in longevity from other factors,
such as a change in fertility, we shall assume that b(z) = b > 0, is unchanged
throughout.
A su¢ cient condition for an increase in longevity to raise aggregate sav-






/F(z;￿) non-decreases in z for all z ￿ 0.
The interpretation of Assumption 2 seems clear. Proportional improve-
ments in survival rates relative to age are non-increasing. For example, a 5
percent improvement in survival probability at age 20 and a 6 percent improve-
ment at age 30, satisfy this assumption. Increases in survival rates generate
an increase in the population￿ s steady-state growth rate. The implied change
in the age density function should be weighed towards younger ages, when
individuals have positive personal savings.
In an example analyzed below, F(z;￿) = e￿￿z, the term in Assumption 2
is equal to minus one for all z and ￿. Hence, the assumption is satis￿ed. Note,
importantly, that this example also satis￿es Assumption 1.
We now state:




Proof. Di⁄erentiating (18) totally w.r.t. ￿; taking into account the de-








































































































> 0. The term in square brackets in (19) approaches 0 as R￿ ! 1. The













































Assumption 2 ensures that (23) is non-negative and hence the term in




13It is worth explaining further the seeming tension between Assumptions
1 and 2 above. Assumption 1, postulating that longevity improvements are
relatively larger at later ages, ensures that individuals (though postponing re-
tirement) increase personal savings. Aggregate savings depend on personal
savings times the number of individuals in each age. Assumption 1 has two
opposite e⁄ects. For a given population growth rate, it tilts the age density
towards older ages. Since individuals dissave at older ages, this has a nega-
tive e⁄ect on aggregate savings. However, higher longevity also increases the
steady-state population growth rate. This tilts the age density towards younger
ages and has, therefore, a positive e⁄ect on aggregate savings. Assumption 2
ensures (it is a su¢ cient condition) that the latter e⁄ect is dominant.
Formally, let ￿F(R) denote the population weighted average improvement





























R: That is, weighted by the population density, longevity improvements are
concentrated at the younger ages.
5 Example: Exponential Survival Function
Some of the above expressions can be solved explicitly for the particular survival
function F(z;￿) = e￿￿z, z ￿ 0.
Equation (6) becomes
c
￿ = w(1 ￿ e
￿￿R￿
) (25)








































The steady-state age density function, (15), is
h(z;￿;g) = (g + ￿)e
￿(g+￿)z (28)
while the population growth rate, g, with constant birth rate, b, is solved
from (16), g = b ￿ ￿.




























We have assumed throughout that annuitization is available, which means that
individuals can take advantage of risk pooling. To demonstrate that this is a







w(z)dz = 0 (31)
In the absence of insurance, there is also a constraint that assets must be
non-negative at all ages (individuals cannot die with debt). Equating expected
marginal utility across ages yields decreasing optimum consumption, whose
shape re￿ ects the individual￿ s degree of risk aversion. To demonstrate that
the e⁄ects of a change in longevity on savings and retirement are, in general,
indeterminate, it su¢ ces to take particular utility and survival functions. Thus,
assume that u(c) = lnc and F(z;￿) = e￿￿z: For a constant wage w(z) = w,
optimum consumption, ^ c(z), now becomes (instead of (6)):
^ c(z) = w￿ ^ Re
￿￿z (32)





w(1 ￿ ￿ ^ R e￿￿z) 0 ￿ z ￿ ^ R
￿w￿ ^ R e￿￿z ^ R ￿ z ￿ 1
(33)




￿ ^ R = e( ^ R): (34)
For this condition to have a unique solution it is assumed that the L.H.S.
strictly decreases with ^ R. This holds i⁄ ^ R <
1
￿
, i.e. optimum retirement age is




￿ 0, that is, as before, an increase in longevity leads
to an increase in retirement age.12
11Social Security systems provide such annuitization which may, however, be inadequate
for some individuals. See Sheshinski (in Aliprantis et-al, (2003), 27-54).
12The same condition ensures the non-negativity of assets at all ages
(S￿(0) = w(1 ￿ ￿R￿) > 0).




￿(g+￿) ^ R ￿




Taking into account that
dg
d￿
= ￿1, it is seen that, holding ^ R constant, a
decrease in ￿ a⁄ects S positively. However, when the change in ^ R is also taken
into account, the direction of the change in S is indeterminate, depending on
parameter con￿guration.
7 Unintended Bequests
The analysis in the previous section disregards the fact that in the absence
of full annuitization there are unintended bequests which a⁄ect individual be-
havior, in particular individual savings13. A general equilibrium analysis of
longevity e⁄ects on aggregate savings has to take these intergenerational trans-
fers into account.
In the absence of full annuitization, uncertain lifetime generates a distri-
bution of bequests which depends on survival probabilities. A proper compar-
ison of steady-states with and without annuitization requires derivation of the
ergodic, long-term, distribution of bequests which, in turn, generates a distrib-
ution of individual and aggregate savings. A general analysis of this process is
beyond the scope of this paper. The issue can, however, be clari￿ed by means
of a simple example.
Suppose that individuals live one period and with probability p, 0 ￿ p ￿ 1;
two periods. With no time preference, expected lifetime utility, V; is
V = u(c) + pu(c1) (36)
13The empirical importance of bequests and intergenerational transfers is debated exten-
sively, among the inconclusive issues is the separation of planned bequests from those due
to lack of annuity markets.
See, for example, Kotliko⁄ and Summers (1981) and most recently Kopczuk and Lupton
(2005).
17where c is ￿rst period consumption and c1 is second period consumption.
Without annuities and a zero interest rate, the budget constraint is
c + c1 = w + b (37)
where w > 0 is income and b ￿ 0 is initial endowment. Let u(c) = lnc: Then








Having no bequest motive, individuals who live two periods leave no be-
quest. Consequently, some individuals will have no initial endowments. Others
will have positive endowments which depend on the history of parental sur-
vivals. In fact, the steady-state distribution of initial endowments is a Renewal
Process.
Denote by ^ bk the initial endowment of an individual whose k previous
generations of parents lived one period only. If p0 is the probability of a zero
endowment, then the probability of ^ bk is (1 ￿ p)k p0: Since p0
1 P
k=0
(1 ￿ p)k = 1;
it follows that p0 = p: We can calculate ^ bk from (38):























w k = 1;2;::: (39)
Thus, savings of an individual with endowment ^ bk; s(^ bk); is




















While S > 0 for any 0 < p < 1; the sign of the e⁄ect on S of an increase
in the survival probability p is indeterminate.
Incorporating a positive birth rate would not change this conclusion: in
the absence of a competitive annuity market, the e⁄ect of increased longevity
on steady-state aggregate savings is indeterminate.
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